Bahrain and UAE to normalize relations with Israel: Rice scholar explains how we got there

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen
By AARON HOWARD | JHV
The number of Arab nations that have diplomatic relations with Israel and recognize the Jewish state’s right to exist has doubled in the past month. On Aug. 13, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel announced plans to normalize relations (the Abraham Accord). Then, on Sept. 11, Bahrain and Israel jointly announced the two nations have agreed to establish full diplomatic relations.

Israel joined Bahrain, the UAE and President Donald Trump for a signing ceremony at the White House on Sept. 15. The nations will begin an exchange of embassies and ambassadors, start direct flights between their countries and launch cooperation initiatives across a broad range of sectors.

The UAE and Bahrain are the first Arab nations to normalize relations with Israel in more than 25 years. 

The JHV reached out to Kristian Coates Ulrichsen at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy to put the diplomatic moves into context. Ulrichsen is a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East, whose academic specialty is the Gulf Cooperation Council states and their changing position within the global order. The six nations of the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 

Ulrichsen has written four books and numerous articles on the Gulf States for the Economist Intelligence Unit, Open Democracy, and Foreign Policy. He authors a monthly column for Gulf Business News and Analysis.

Ulrichsen told the JHV that, with the partial exception of Kuwait, the position of the Gulf states toward Israel has shifted from varying degrees of outright hostility to one of pragmatic and increasingly open accommodation. Although there were early instances of joint research and technical cooperation, such as the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Oman, this process really accelerated after 2011. That’s when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE realized the increasing influence of Iran and political Islam was much more of a real threat than Israel. 

“At a macro-level, they began to see Iran and militant Islam as a threat to their security. This was one factor of many,” said Ulrichsen. “There was also the realization that Palestine was no longer the main dividing issue in Middle East politics.

“There was also the age factor. Young people in the GCC see Israel as an example of innovation, of where they’d like their countries to be in the future, in terms of technology and getting the most out of their natural resources.”

Another factor was the rise of a new generation into leadership roles in Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. Many of these young leaders have demonstrated an openness – in different ways and for different reasons – to engaging with their Israeli counterparts. For example, official and nonofficial dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Israeli officials has become more open and has been covered by local Gulf media. Trade between the UAE and Israel has multiplied in recent years and is conducted mostly through intermediary companies. Trade is focused primarily on agricultural and medical technologies, security and communications systems. 

Bahrain and the UAE also have developed a values-based form of outreach, based on interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, said Ulrichsen. As tools of “soft power,” the Emirati and Bahraini initiatives send a message of moderation to an international audience. It also, in part, deflects from and obscures the domestic crackdowns on Islamists (in the UAE) and a primarily Shia-led political opposition (in Bahrain).

“During the Arab Spring, the anti-government protests in Bahrain were led by a Shia opposition,” said Ulrichsen. “On the other hand, Bahrain appointed a Jewish woman [Houda Ezra Nonoo] to serve as ambassador to the United States and a Christian woman [Alees Thomas Samaan] as ambassador to the United Kingdom. These women were well-deserving of their positions. But, it was also a way to deflect criticism of a political crackdown. These appointments helped people who may not know much about the Gulf to shift the conversation. It improved their international standing to some extent. 

“The UAE and Bahrain have broken the regional consensus that normalization depends on a land-for-peace deal or until Israel withdraws from occupied territories. They would claim they’ve stopped further annexation. 

“But then, diplomatic recognition merely formalizes something that was already happening for the last 10-15 years. As far back as 2009, the Crown Prince of Bahrain Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa wrote an op-ed piece, published in the Washington Post, urging normalization. To some extent, this was predicted.”

In 2017, President Trump tasked Jared Kushner to draw up a peace plan that focused on normalizing Arab-Israeli relations, rather than advocating for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. The result was the January 2020 peace plan, “Peace to Prosperity.” 

All six Gulf states rejected the Trump peace plan when it was introduced.

Ulrichsen believes the GCC states felt they had to reject the plan for domestic reasons and because they felt the Trump plan was heavily skewed towards the Israelis. 

“They said so carefully in the form of a collective statement from the Arab League. You could see the Saudi influence in the wording. The Saudis can’t be seen to be openly abandoning the Palestinian cause,” said Ulrichsen.

The big question

Did the Israelis, the UAE, Bahrain and Washington all sign on to the same agreement to “normalize” relations?  

“This is the big question,” answered Ulrichsen. “I don’t know if the text has been released. They are using different terms for things like ‘annexation.’ This may reflect politicians talking to their particular constituencies. Or, it might reflect a general agreement without being substantive. We, at this stage, don’t know whether it’s a translation of the text issue or something much more substantial.”

Also of note: At the Sept. 15 signing ceremony in Washington, the U.S. was represented by its president. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu represented Israel. The UAE was represented by their foreign minister, not the Crown Prince. Possibly, the UAE just wants to be careful and have a lower-level person sign the accord, in case something goes wrong later. 

Palestinian reaction

Needless to say, the official Palestinian reaction to the UAE and Bahrain normalization of ties with Israel was negative. The Palestinian Authority called the normalization deal “a stab in the back of the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people.”  

According to Al-Jazeera, at a Sept. 9 virtual meeting of the Arab League, the Palestinian delegation presented a draft resolution that called for the Arab League to officially condemned the Israeli-UAE normalization agreement. This draft followed an earlier statement by the PA leadership that if Arab League chief, Ahmed Aboul-Gheit, didn’t condemn the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, then he should step down.

After a three-hour discussion, Palestine and the Arab countries agreed not to include a condemnation of the UAE-Israel deal. (Palestine is a full member of the Arab League.)

Instead, the Arab League agreed to a Saudi-sponsored final communique that stated the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative remains the road map for a “just solution” to the Palestinian cause.

(The 2002 Arab Peace Plan calls for an end to “Israeli occupation,” and establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with east Jerusalem as its capital.)

“Just two weeks ago, the king of Bahrain told Jared Kushner when he visited there that Bahrain wouldn’t be recognizing Israel. Something changed in the last two weeks, but we don’t know why it changed,’ said Ulrichsen.

“I don’t see any other Arab states formally doing this in the next month. But I didn’t see Bahrain coming.”